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In this essay I will argue, flouting paradox, that Mill was a utilitarian but
not a consequentialist. According to the textbook definition, of course,
utilitarianism just is the combination of a certain sort of theory of the
good (as pleasure, happiness, or flourishing) and a consequentialist the-
ory of the right. My conclusion thus seems necessarily false. Neverthe-
less, the argument will proceed in two stages. First, I argue that there is
logical space for a view that deserves to be called utilitarian despite its
rejection of consequentialism. Then I argue that this position was in fact
occupied by the most renowned utilitarian, John Stuart Mill.
The first step in my argument rests on what might be consid-
ered a clever trick, at best; but this is to be expected when one argues
for a claim that seems necessarily false. I concede from the beginning,
though, that were my conclusion merely a semantic or conceptual point,
this argument would be of little interest. But the conclusion is quite
interesting because the tricky step in the argument exposes an implicit
feature of consequentialism that is both substantive and dubious and
has received inadequate attention. Examination of this implicit assump-
tion will reveal an important contrast between consequentialism and its
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cognates and will help illuminate an insufficiently explored aspect of
Mill’s moral and political philosophy. I refer here to Mill’s sentimentalist
metaethics, which proves crucial for understanding his view of morality
as comprising just one distinct sphere within what he called “the Art
of Life, in its three departments, Morality, Prudence or Policy, and Aes-
thetics; the Right, the Expedient, and the Beautiful or Noble, in human
conduct and works” (System of Logic, CW 7:949).1
The failure of the standard interpretation of Mill to account for
his sentimentalism has led to a profound misreading of his moral the-
ory, which makes Mill out to be a predecessor of the most fashionable
view in the neighborhood of utilitarianism: namely, multilevel maxi-
mizing act-consequentialism.2 Despite the popularity of this theory and
the predominance of this interpretation, it cannot be reconciled with
some of Mill’s most distinctive and important claims. Its advocates there-
fore must ignore or traduce crucial aspects of his work, to the point
of attributing a dissimulation hypothesis to Mill, on which he (spo-
radically) conceals his genuine but “esoteric” morality for instrumental
purposes.3 Surely this should be an interpretive strategy of last resort,
especially when another reading both comports better with what he
actually wrote and fits more neatly into his historical context. Moreover,
I find Mill’s highly unorthodox brand of utilitarianism especially attrac-
tive for several reasons, including its engagement with disparate emo-
tions, both moral and nonmoral, and its resistance to the pervasiveness
1. J. M. Robson, ed., Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1969). References to Mill will be to the Collected Works (CW ), except
for Utilitarianism (U ) and On Liberty (OL), which will be given in the text as (Title:
chapter. paragraph).
2. While there have been various other interpretations of Mill, none has won
wide favor. Because of the immensity of Mill scholarship, I make no attempt to be
comprehensive, but instead aim to reflect the current state of play as illustrated in
important recent surveys and anthologies published by major academic presses.
3. The idea of an esoteric morality, which must be hidden from the masses, is
due to Henry Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981),
esp. 490. Sidgwick (ibid., 490) notes further that “similarly it seems expedient that
the doctrine that esoteric morality is expedient should itself be kept esoteric.” Derek
Parfit considers the possibility that consequentialism might be “self-effacing,” in that
it would be better by the theory’s own lights if few, or even no one, believed it. See
Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). I am not claiming
that a self-effacing utilitarianism is no utilitarianism at all, or that self-effacing views
are thereby self-defeating. Rather, I aim to illustrate the extreme cost of attributing a
dissimulation hypothesis to Mill, when he never champions—or even considers—the




of more orthodox forms of the theory which allow moral considerations
to occupy the entire evaluative domain rather than only one among
three spheres of value.
Mill thought this error characteristic of moralists of all theoretical
bents, though he attributes it expressly to Bentham:
This error, or rather one-sidedness, belongs to him not as a utilitarian,
but as a moralist by profession, and in common with almost all professed
moralists, whether religious or philosophical: it is that of treating the
moral view of actions and characters, which is unquestionably the first
and most important mode of looking at them, as if it were the sole one:
whereas it is only one of three, by all of which our sentiments toward
the human being may be, ought to be, and without entirely crushing
our own nature cannot but be, materially influenced. (“Bentham,” CW
10:112)
Both Mill’s sentimentalism and his resistance to the narrow-mindedness
of moralism are illustrated nicely by this quotation. In what follows, I will
argue that Mill’s sentimentalist ethics renders his account of right and
wrong both less strictly impartial and less pervasive than consequential-
ism presupposes.
More than fifty years ago, J. O. Urmson, lamenting the state of
Mill scholarship, wrote that if Mill were interpreted with “half the sym-
pathy accorded to Plato, Leibniz, and Kant, an essentially consistent the-
sis can be discovered which is very superior to that usually attributed
to Mill and immune to the common run of criticisms.”4 Undoubtedly,
matters have improved since then, thanks in no small part to Urmson,
although his own rule-utilitarian interpretation of Mill has not been
widely accepted.5 The standard view of Mill’s moral theory today still
attributes to him a maximizing act-consequentialist moral theory despite
4. J. O. Urmson, “The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J. S. Mill,” in
Mill’s Utilitarianism: Critical Essays, ed. David Lyons (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield,
1997), 1.
5. Urmson’s brief sketch of an interpretation of Mill’s moral theory has been
effectively challenged by Fred Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom: The Moral and
Political Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
For another influential challenge to Urmson, which I find less convincing, see D. G.
Brown, “Mill’s Act-Utilitarianism,” Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974): 67–68. Although
David Lyons defends and develops one crucial aspect of Urmson’s reading, which I
will utilize also, Lyons puts his view forward as a reconstruction of Mill’s view and
admits that his is the minority opinion: “Scholars generally prefer an act-utilitarian
reading of Mill. This may be a reflection of the fact that consequentialists generally
and utilitarians in particular tend to favor ‘act’ versions of those theory-types.” David
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its inconsistency with much of Mill’s writing and its vulnerability to
familiar and powerful objections. As Roger Crisp, perhaps the leading
advocate of this interpretation, expresses it: “The right action will be
that which produces the greatest balance of happiness over unhappi-
ness overall,” according to Mill, and “any other action [than this opti-
mific one] will be wrong.”6 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord claims, similarly, that
“according to [Mill’s] standard of conduct, an agent has performed
the right act if and only if that act is among the agent’s best available
options. To have taken any less than the best available option is, Mill
thinks, to have performed the wrong act.”7
Although this standard interpretation attributes fundamentally
the same moral theory to Mill as those readings Urmson excoriated as
“so unsympathetic and so incorrect,” its current advocates far exceed
Urmson’s antagonists in their scholarship and philosophical acumen.8
And since the multilevel version of the direct and maximizing theory
they advocate—of the sort developed most compellingly by R. M. Hare
and Peter Railton—surpasses older and less sophisticated versions of
consequentialism, their reading is also more charitable to Mill.9 Yet the
move to a multilevel view does not change the theory’s criterion of right-
ness, which still identifies right action as the best available option: the
one that creates the greatest net good. It simply differentiates between
Lyons, “Introduction,” in Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 21.
6. Roger Crisp, ed., J. S. Mill: Utilitarianism, Oxford Philosophical Texts (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998), 115; Roger Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism, Routledge Phi-
losophy Guidebooks (London: Routledge, 1997), 96. As these prestigious recent com-
missions suggest, Crisp’s reading of Mill can fairly be called standard.
7. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, “Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility: A More Than
Half-Hearted Defense,” Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2001): 331–32. In fairness to
Sayre-McCord, it should be noted that he makes this claim in passing, while in pur-
suit of a different argument. However, the fact that he advances it without argument
provides even more support for my contention that this has become the conventional
interpretation of Mill’s moral theory.
8. Urmson, “Moral Philosophy of J. S. Mill,” 8.
9. Although the idea of an esoteric utilitarian morality was broached by Sidg-
wick, the locus classicus of its modern development, in the form of a sharp separation
between the criterion of rightness of a moral theory and its recommendations for ordi-
nary moral thinking, can be found in R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and
Point (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); and Peter Railton, “Alienation, Consequential-
ism, and the Demands of Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134–71.




this criterion and the decision procedure, or ways of moral thinking,
recommended by the theory. The basic insight is that consequentialism
need not recommend that a moral agent think like a consequentialist,
in the sense of aiming at maximizing the common good, any more than
an egoistic hedonist must aim directly at pleasure. Indeed, if overtly
consequentialist thinking has the problems often claimed of it, then
the theory will not so recommend. This is an important insight and a
real advance, but the more sophisticated theory accepts the same old
account of right and wrong; its novelty consists in its recommendations
for how to engage in moral thinking and moralizing. In particular, the
multilevel view allows consequentialists to avow—and even to believe—
claims that, strictly speaking, are false according to their theory. It rec-
ommends alienation from the most exigent demands of morality, and
even dissimulation (to oneself and others) about the true but esoteric
morality, whenever that would have better consequences than sincerity.
This essay will not attempt to demonstrate that Crisp’s reading
is largely wrong or that Urmson was fundamentally correct, contrary
to the conventional assessment, although that is my view.10 My com-
plaint against Crisp and the other advocates of the standard interpre-
tation is nearly antithetical to Urmson’s complaint against his antago-
nists. Mill is now read not unsympathetically but anachronistically: too
much through the lens of twentieth-century developments in ethical
theory, specifically in the evolution of consequentialism to its current
level of sophistication. By reminding ourselves of the state of play in
the nineteenth-century debates over utilitarianism, we can avoid prob-
lems arising from reading Mill as a sophisticated, twentieth-century con-
sequentialist, engaged in principled dissimulation about an esoteric
morality. Moreover, by bringing to light an implicit presupposition of
consequentialism, we can come to see the theoretical advantages of
rejecting the strict form of impartiality it embraces.
10. Although there are problems of both omission and commission in Urmson’s
arguments, I ally myself with Urmson and Lyons on the whole, while deviating from
each in some crucial respects. For another like-minded reading, see Alan Fuchs, “Mill’s
Theory of Morally Correct Action,” in The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism, ed.
Henry West (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 139–58. However, in my opinion no one has
adequately connected Mill’s sentimentalist metaethics with his classical liberalism, as
expressed especially in On Liberty. See also John Skorupski, “The Place of Utilitarian-
ism in Mill’s Philosophy,” in West, Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism, 46–60. An excellent
treatment of many of these issues can be found in John Skorupski, John Stuart Mill
(London: Routledge, 1989), but I think even Skorupski does not adequately appreciate
Mill’s sentimentalism.
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Hence, even readers who are not convinced by the argument of
the first section of this essay—which claims that there can be nonconse-
quentialist forms of utilitarianism—can grant the possibility of a moral
theory with some distinctive advantages over ordinary consequentialism
and which corresponds better to some famous aspects of Mill’s thought.
Furthermore, readers who are not persuaded by the argument of the
second section—that Mill is best read as rejecting an essential element
of consequentialism—can grant that several of Mill’s explicit claims and
deepest commitments cannot be reconciled with that theory. My the-
sis that Mill was a utilitarian but not a consequentialist is not merely
a rhetorical flourish, however. If I am right to think that current Mill
scholarship suffers from anachronism, and in particular that modern
readers have lost sight of the fact that Mill’s conception of utilitarianism
was considerably broader than can be accommodated by contemporary
consequentialist theory, then this way of putting the point is especially
apposite because ‘utilitarianism’ is a nineteenth-century term, whereas
‘consequentialism’ was coined in the twentieth century.
I.
Let us begin with the trick: the move that avoids self-contradiction.
Surely consequentialism is a philosophers’ term of art, which means what-
ever philosophers have meant by it over the past half-century or so,
when the term was coined and earned its place in the philosophical
lexicon. By contrast, utilitarianism was a movement in the history of
ideas.11 Hence, that appellation must be understood broadly enough
to include the views of the classical Utilitarians—in particular, Jeremy
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, unquestionably the two most impor-
tant utilitarians prior to Henry Sidgwick. But because ‘utilitarianism’
has a semantic debt to the history of philosophy that ‘consequentialism’
does not, it is possible for the two theories to diverge in unexpected
ways. This despite the fact that the very concept of consequentialism
was derived from utilitarianism—that is, from the orthodox form of the
theory that became standard after Sidgwick—by abstracting away from
its theory of the good, whence the textbook definition, on which utili-
tarianism entails consequentialism. Nevertheless, if some of the classical
11. While there is some doubt as to the term’s provenance, it is typically attributed




Utilitarians did not accept the presuppositions that philosophers now
routinely associate with consequentialism, then they were not conse-
quentialists.
In claiming that consequentialism must be understood however
philosophers commonly understand it, I am not supposing that its philo-
sophical usage is uniform or precise. It is not.12 But we can bracket our
target quickly and relatively uncontroversially and then home in on it
in a principled way. Some characterizations of consequentialism imply
that it requires maximal promotion of the good, impartially considered,
thereby ruling out both indirect (for example, rule-based) and satisfic-
ing (that is, nonmaximizing) versions of the theory. Shelly Kagan thus
defines consequentialism as “the view that an act is right if and only
if it leads to the best consequences.”13 Yet Kagan’s usage seems arti-
ficially stipulative since he grants that “a maximizing approach is not
the only one compatible with act consequentialism,” though historically,
“the fact remains that act consequentialists have almost always been max-
imizers.”14 By his own admission, his official definition is too narrow to
capture either common usage or theoretical possibility. Even so, Kagan’s
gloss is common and describes the most popular form of the theory; it
can aptly be called orthodox consequentialism.
12. Indeed, a notion of consequentialism has recently been introduced accord-
ing to which, by stipulation, “every moral view is consequentialist.” See James Dreier,
“Structures of Normative Theories,” The Monist 76 (1993): 24. This approach fixes on
the dictum that it must be right to produce the best possible consequences, and then
understands the concepts of value and consequence in whatever manner is necessary in
order to preserve this maximizing dictum. In particular, it does so by adducing the
notion of agent-relative value. I am not convinced of the merits of this approach since
the claim that it is always right to bring about the best consequences seems to me
far from trivial, and agent-relative conceptions of value seem quite problematic from
the perspective of value theory. In any case, this will surely remain an idiosyncratic
usage. Obviously Mill’s utilitarianism, like every other moral view, counts as a form of
consequentialism in this truistic sense. See also Douglas Portmore, “Position-Relative
Consequentialism, Agent-Centered Options, and Supererogation,” Ethics 113 (2003):
303–32. Portmore develops a conception of consequentialism without the presuppo-
sition of agent neutrality, on which every agent is given the same set of aims. This
approach does not make every moral view consequentialist, but it does include many
theories that are not typically classed as such. This distinction will not be crucial to
my argument, and I will largely ignore it hereafter. Compare Portmore, “Dual-Ranking
Act-Consequentialism,” Philosophical Studies (forthcoming), where he acknowledges that
this sort of theory falls outside the range normally considered consequentialist.
13. Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), 61.
14. Ibid., 219, 223.
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On the other hand, one can also find characterizations of conse-
quentialism broad enough to include any moral theory on which the
rightness and wrongness of action is somehow determined by conse-
quences alone. Thus Walter Sinnott-Armstrong first defines consequen-
tialism as the view that “whether an act is morally right depends only on
consequences,” but he later concludes that, although this thesis is nec-
essary, “it is less clear whether that claim by itself is sufficient to make a
theory consequentialist.”15 Sinnott-Armstrong here deliberately avoids
two thorny issues for consequentialism: what count as consequences,
and which consequences count for moral judgment. But however we
answer those questions, consequentialism requires more than this mini-
mal thesis if we are to avoid drastically revising our taxonomy. As Sinnott-
Armstrong notes, this capacious conception would make some unlikely
theories consequentialist: not only ethical egoism, but also such theo-
ries as Bentham’s imaginary principle of asceticism, which instructs us
to minimize happiness. I propose to use Mill’s name for the class of
normative theories with this structure, on which considerations of good-
ness are the sole normative determinant of rightness: these are teleologi-
cal theories.16 Although the distinction I propose between teleology and
consequentialism is not uncontroversial, it should be noted that Samuel
Scheffler defends a teleological theory, in this sense, in a book entitled
The Rejection of Consequentialism.17
Following both Kagan and Sinnott-Armstrong in spirit, though
neither in letter, I will eschew both these admitted extremes and seek
a more standard gloss of consequentialism.18 This choice is not just a
15. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Consequentialism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Summer 2003 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2, 13, plato.stanford.edu/
archives/sum2003/entries/consequentialism (emphasis in original).
16. In his System of Logic, Mill differentiates between the propositions of Science,
which assert matters of fact, and normative propositions, which identify the goal of
any practical domain or Art (as he calls them). “Every art is thus a joint result of laws
of nature disclosed by science, and of the general principles of what has been called
Teleology, or the Doctrine of Ends” (Logic, CW 7:949). In all of practical reasoning,
including morality, Mill claims the principle of utility to be the final end: its teleology.
17. See Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994). In Scheffler’s view, agents are allowed to favor their own wel-
fare, though it is always permissible to maximize utility impartially considered. My read-
ing of Mill resembles consequentialism considerably less than does Scheffler’s “hybrid”
(which is to say, avowedly nonconsequentialist) theory, as will be illustrated in the fol-
lowing section.
18. The most developed exposition of the varieties of consequentialism comes from
Peter Vallentyne who holds, somewhat idiosyncratically, that indirect (for instance,
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matter of splitting the difference or adopting the consensus view,
though I think it does both. More important, there is a principled rea-
son to adopt the gloss I favor. This reason is given by Rawls, who writes:
The most natural way, then, of arriving at utilitarianism (although not,
of course, the only way of doing so) is to adopt for society as a whole
the principle of rational choice for one man. Once this is recognized,
the place of the impartial spectator and the emphasis on sympathy in
the history of utilitarian thought is readily understood. For it is by the
conception of the impartial spectator and the use of sympathetic iden-
tification in guiding our imagination that the principle for one man is
applied to society.19
Although Rawls speaks of utilitarianism, he notes, “the kind of utilitari-
anism I shall describe here is the strict classical doctrine which receives
perhaps its clearest and most accessible formulation in Sidgwick.”20 I
will therefore refer to this direct, maximizing, and strictly impartial the-
ory as orthodox utilitarianism, on analogy with orthodox consequential-
ism, whereas I will call the philosophers associated with the historical
movement Utilitarians, with a capital ‘U’. Though Sidgwick was both an
orthodox and a classical Utilitarian, Mill was, in his own words, a util-
itarian only “in quite another sense from what perhaps anyone except
rule-based) theories are not genuinely consequentialist. Vallentyne characterizes the
two fundamental claims of what he calls core consequentialism as supervenience and value
promotion. See Vallentyne, “Against Maximizing Act Consequentialism,” in Contempo-
rary Debates in Moral Theory, ed. James Dreier (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 21–37. The
supervenience thesis (ibid., 22) states: “The permissibility of actions in a given choice
situation supervenes on (is fully determined by) the value of their consequences.”
The value promotion thesis states: “If, in a given choice situation, one action is per-
missible, and a second is more valuable, then the second action is also permissible.”
Since neither thesis is compatible with rule-consequentialism, this usage would make
my task too easy: I am not merely arguing that Mill was no act consequentialist. But
it is worth noting that, on my reading, Mill’s moral theory rejects both the superve-
nience and value promotion theses for different reasons than do indirect consequentialist
theories (though it rejects them for those reasons as well). Specifically, it rejects both
core claims of consequentialism because they fail to distinguish between two equally
valuable states of affairs: (the same quantity and quality of) the agent’s happiness and
the happiness of another.
19. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971),
26–27.
20. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 22. My only quibble with Rawls here is over the word
‘classical’, which I would replace with ‘orthodox’ so as to avoid any misleading histor-
ical implications.
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myself understands by that word” (letter to Carlyle, no. 95 [1834],
CW 7:207).21
Nevertheless, Rawls is surely correct to note that the metaphor of
the impartial spectator has played a crucial role in the history of utilitar-
ianism.22 Indeed, he highlights exactly the feature of consequentialism
on which I want to focus, albeit for a different reason. “The striking fea-
ture” of this view, he writes, “is that it does not matter, except indirectly, how
this sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals any more than it
matters, except indirectly, how one man distributes his satisfactions over
time.”23 Another implication of the metaphor, which has lately become
more remarkable, is that it entails an agent-neutral conception of value,
on which the value of a state of affairs does not differ depending on
who evaluates it.24 Since the spectator’s perspective determines the value
of a state of affairs, and does so in just the same way for everyone,
the metaphor clearly presupposes an agent-neutral conception of value.
Indeed, agent neutrality tends to be taken as partly definitive of conse-
quentialism. But I want to focus on another implication of this trope.
Whereas Rawls was concerned primarily with issues of distribu-
tion, my interest in the impartial spectator metaphor concerns its impli-
cation of a kind of moral symmetry between self and other: everyone’s
happiness counts in exactly the same way, when it comes to evaluating
acts as right and wrong. We might call this commitment deontic impar-
tiality because it adopts impartiality as an abstract rule governing the
morality of action. We can then differentiate it from a less stringent
notion of axiological impartiality: the claim that everyone’s happiness, if
equal in quantity and quality, is equally valuable. Since the metaphorical
21. For discussion of the importance of this letter, and for argument that Mill’s
conception of himself as an unorthodox utilitarian remained stable throughout his
life, see Daniel Jacobson, “J. S. Mill and the Diversity of Utilitarianism,” Philosophers’
Imprint 3 (2003), www.philosophersimprint.org/003002/.
22. See Stephen Darwall, “Hume and the Invention of Utilitarianism,” in Hume and
Hume’s Connexions, ed. M. A. Stewart and John Wright (University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1994), 58–82.
23. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 26; emphasis added. This point was crucially important
for Rawls, of course, because it underwrites his complaint that utilitarianism does not
respect the separateness of persons. My purposes are different, though they too focus
on the metaphor’s implication that it does not matter, from the point of view of moral-
ity, whose happiness is promoted or diminished; only the sum (or perhaps the average)
of satisfaction matters.
24. Compare Amartya Sen’s development of the notion of agent-relative value,
especially in his “Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation,” Philosophy and
Public Affairs 12 (1983): 113–32.
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impartial (and perfectly sympathetic) spectator takes on everyone’s plea-
sures and pains as if they were his own, that metaphor entails a deon-
tically impartial conception of morality. By contrast, axiological impar-
tiality only concerns the theory of value. This value theory, and not any
particular way of applying it either as decision procedure or criterion of
rightness, Mill considered definitive of utilitarianism. He calls the doc-
trine that “one person’s happiness . . . is counted for exactly as much as
another’s” nothing less than an “explanatory commentary” on the prin-
ciple of utility (U: 5.36).25
I propose, then, to adopt the broadest conception of consequen-
tialism compatible with the deontic impartiality and agent neutrality
implied by the impartial spectator trope. Specifically, we should under-
stand consequentialism to allow for either direct or indirect theories of
the right, and for both subjective versions of the theory, which focus on
expected consequences of action, and objective versions, which focus
on actual consequences. Finally, we should not assume that consequen-
tialism requires the maximization of value. Instead, we can allow for
satisficing accounts on which suboptimal promotion of the good can
be morally permissible and greater promotion supererogatory, without
undermining the impartial spectator basis for consequentialism. (It is
important to note that these distinctions are not anachronistic, though
I have framed them in modern terms, since in every case there were
25. My implicit claim that Mill rejects deontic impartiality, which would condemn
all action that favors the interests of those one cares about over anyone else’s, is admit-
tedly contentious. It may be recalled that Mill (U: 2.18) writes that “the happiness
which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own
happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others,
utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent
spectator.” However, his point here is to differentiate between utilitarianism and ego-
ism. For this purpose one need not embrace a stronger form of impartiality than the
axiological version to which Mill certainly subscribes, though of course one does need
to count at least some harms and goods of others as contributing to the rightness
and wrongness of actions. Obviously Mill accepts this extremely weak claim. Yet he
repeatedly denies the stricter demands of deontic impartiality, as in his 1862 letter
to Grote (no. 525), where he explicates his argument and intentions in Utilitarianism.
There (CW 15:762) he writes, “people must not be required to sacrifice even their own
lesser good to another’s greater, where no general rule has given the other a right to
the sacrifice.” This is not an idiosyncratic remark, as it gets repeated throughout Mill’s
work. Whereas deontic impartiality requires just such sacrifice, axiological impartiality
can allow that one’s reasons, even moral reasons, differ depending on whose good is
affected by an action—even though everyone’s happiness is equally valuable. Note too
that Mill (in U: 5.9)expressly rejects deontic impartiality “as an obligation of justice.”
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advocates of both sides of these disputes among Mill’s contempo-
raries.26) So long as a satisficing or indirect theory treats all value iden-
tically, without regard for whose interests it affects (if anyone’s), the
theory abides by deontic impartiality, and therefore counts as conse-
quentialist.
Let me clarify the dialectical situation at this point. My adoption
of the broadest conception of consequentialism compatible with the
impartial spectator metaphor deliberately makes my task more difficult
and significant, in two respects. First, the more capacious a notion of
consequentialism I adopt, the more interesting becomes my claim that
utilitarianism need not be consequentialist. Second, this broad concep-
tion circumvents a simpler (and less interesting) argument that Mill was
no consequentialist. Mill repeatedly insisted on recognizing a class of
supererogatory action, and he held that it is impermissible to violate cer-
tain basic rights for the sake of maximizing the good.27 While it is true
that these views are inconsistent with orthodox consequentialism, they
are nonetheless compatible with other versions of the theory; therefore,
I will not rest my argument that Mill was no consequentialist on these
points. Instead, according to the conception I will take as standard, a
moral theory is consequentialist just in case it holds that the rightness
and wrongness of an action is determined (perhaps indirectly) solely
by consequences (actual or expected), evaluated under strict deontic
impartiality and in an agent-neutral manner.28
26. In particular, the denial of supererogation was the fourteenth of the thirty-nine
articles of the Church of England, which Mill rejected throughout his career, defend-
ing supererogation against the charge of “Popish laxity” made by the likes of Godwin.
Although ‘satisficing’ is a modern term, any utilitarian view that defends supereroga-
tion entails such a view. If I am correct, Mill advocated a satisficing, subjectivist, and
indirect (sanction-based) form of utilitarianism: he explicitly endorsed supererogation,
claimed that the “natural” or expected consequences of an action determine its moral-
ity, and identified wrong action with the blameworthy. Or so I will argue.
27. On these points see respectively Jacobson, “The Diversity of Utilitarianism” and
Daniel Jacobson, “Mill on Liberty, Speech, and the Free Society,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 29 (2000): 276–309. Mill’s commitments to rights and to supererogation are
obscured by the common tendency to place far too much weight on chapter 2 of Util-
itarianism, especially its statement of the greatest happiness principle, which I contend
was crafted to be just what Mill there claims it is: a creed held in common among Util-
itarians rather than any specific version of the theory. Even this famous proportionality
statement of the principle conflicts with orthodox consequentialism since it allows for
degrees of rightness instead of holding that only the best action is right.
28. Note that I am deliberately avoiding the question of exactly which conse-
quences are relevant: those of the specific act, the “natural” consequences of acts of
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This gloss captures what most philosophers mean by ‘consequen-
tialism’, and it includes not just the orthodox form of the theory,
widely held to be its most powerful version, but also the other common
alternatives, such as satisficing act-consequentialism and indirect rule-
consequentialism. This is what I will mean by the term hereafter. In addi-
tion to including all the versions of consequentialism most commonly
advanced by its proponents or attacked by its antagonists, my gloss also
has an independent motivation, given by Rawls, which is both theoreti-
cally grounded and historically important. Now suppose I am right that
‘utilitarianism’ has a semantic debt to the history of philosophy, such
that it must be understood capaciously enough to capture the views
of the classical Utilitarians. If their conception of utilitarianism proves
more diverse and less orthodox than the consequentialist schema can
accommodate, then I will have shown that the textbook definition of
utilitarianism obscures an implicit presupposition of consequentialism.
Moreover, insofar as this assumption turns out to be both substantive
and dubious, this point reveals unexplored avenues for moral theory
in the utilitarian style. The best way to bring out this assumption is to
consider how a utilitarian might reject consequentialism by holding a
teleological moral theory, along with a utilitarian theory of value, while
rejecting deontic impartiality—in particular, the claim that it makes no
moral difference who is harmed or benefited.29
Consider actions whose only evaluative consequences concern
the agent’s own good: what are often called self-regarding actions.30 This
that type, or even those that would issue from the acceptance of a rule prohibiting
or requiring such actions. Moreover, these consequences can include the value of the
act itself, and they might be compared to the available alternatives or judged by some
noncomparative standard (such as whether the act creates or diminishes happiness).
But the crucial point is that whichever consequences count, the impartial spectator
metaphor requires that they be considered identically regardless of who is benefited
or harmed. This implies both deontic impartiality and agent-neutrality.
29. Notice that rule-consequentialism’s commitment to deontic impartiality may be
obscured by the fact that the best moral rules are likely to allow for some partiality:
perhaps we will be permitted to save our loved ones rather than the Archbishop (to
borrow Godwin’s famous case). Nevertheless, at the foundational level where moral
rules are justified, consequences are assessed under deontic impartiality. Hence, objec-
tions to Mill’s antipaternalism are not answered simply by attributing a rule-based the-
ory to him because it seems likely that the best set of moral rules will include some
paternalistic ones.
30. I am following the standard practice of understanding the consequences of an
action in a broad and vague way, so as to include effects that are not caused by the
action but follow from it in some looser sense—as my dog’s chasing the rabbit is a
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term is closely associated with Mill but, unfortunately, its conventional
meaning is not quite what Mill meant by it.31 Therefore I will call such
actions purely self-regarding ; in the following section, where it will be
important to differentiate Mill’s usage from the conventional one, I will
explicate this distinction. As an example of a purely self-regarding but
evaluatively significant act, harmful only to the agent, imagine that I
decide to hit my thumb with a hammer, causing myself intense and
utterly avoidable pain but affecting no one else. The failure to promote
my own good does not seem to be a moral failing as such, even when
there are no countermanding positive consequences for others. Such
bad decisions are foolish—when they are truly bad decisions and not just
unfortunate outcomes—but not wrong. Consequentialism seems to mis-
take prudence for morality, when considering the purely self-regarding.
Moreover, this mistake follows directly from the impartial spectator
metaphor, which implies that pains and pleasures count toward the
morality of action identically, regardless of who suffers them, the agent or
another.
According to commonsense morality, by contrast, there is a fun-
damental asymmetry between self and other. As Michael Slote writes,
“over a large range of cases our ordinary thinking about morality assigns
no positive value to the well-being or happiness of the moral agent of
the sort it clearly assigns to the well-being or happiness of everyone other
than the agent.”32 Arguably, however, imprudence is not even a pro tanto
wrong-making feature of action.33 This is not merely a freestanding
intuition. It can be buttressed by a sentimentalist argument connect-
ing specific evaluative judgments to distinct emotions—as comic judg-
ments about what is funny are connected to amusement rather than
consequence of my not commanding her to stay. The value of actions themselves, not
just their outcomes, is also standardly included in the consequentialist tally.
31. See Jacobson, “Mill on Liberty.”
32. Michael Slote, “Some Advantages of Virtue Ethics,” in Identity, Character, and
Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amelie Rorty (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1990), 441. This asymmetry claim is consistent with acknowledging
duties to oneself, such as not to waste one’s talents, so long as these duties do not
include promoting our own happiness whenever there is no countermanding duty to
others.
33. I am here using ‘wrong’ narrowly, as a distinctively moral term, as (we shall see)
does Mill. Sometimes philosophers use it more broadly, as a normative term that can be
applied from various evaluative perspectives. Obviously imprudence counts decisively




disgust. Moral judgments seem tied to different emotions than are pru-
dential judgments: specifically, to guilt rather than regret (in the first-
person case). If guilt essentially involves the motive to make reparations,
whereas regret involves the motive to change policy, then regret but not
guilt will be fittingly felt toward one’s purely self-regarding blunders.
Although this sentimentalist conception of morality is controversial,
it has some influential modern proponents and a significant historical
pedigree. Most notably, this was Mill’s conception of morality.
It should come as no surprise that moral theories hostile to conse-
quentialism, and commonsense intuitions in tension with it, reject deon-
tic impartiality. More remarkable, though, is the fact that even by the
lights of a broadly teleological theory, deontic impartiality seems both
optional and controversial. Recall that I mean what Mill meant by a
teleological theory, which is only half of what Rawls means by the term.
Rawls called views teleological when they hold that “the good is defined
independently of the right, and the right is defined as that which maxi-
mizes the good.”34 But Rawls’s distinction flouts the historical context of
this debate by deviating from a different bifurcating distinction between
moral theories, drawn by both the classical Utilitarians and their oppo-
nents. The importance of this point, beyond its exegetical significance,
is that it helps demonstrate what Mill and his contemporaries meant by
utilitarianism.
Both Mill and his antagonists routinely differentiated between
two schools of ethics. As he explains: “According to one opinion, the
principles of morals are evident a priori, requiring nothing to com-
mand assent, except that the meaning of their terms be understood.
According to the other doctrine, right and wrong . . . are questions of
observation and experience” (U: 1.3). The first sort of theory was called
intuitive, independent, or a priori; the second, inductive, dependent,
teleological, or indeed utilitarian. Mill accepted this admittedly coarse-
grained dichotomy throughout his career, and he repeatedly defended
34. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 24. He then constructs a dichotomy by calling deontolog-
ical all those views that are not in this sense teleological—a class that includes indirect
and other nonmaximizing versions of consequentialism, as well as Kantianism, virtue
ethics, and more. This seems unlikely to be a perspicuous taxonomy, when one side is
so uniform and the other so diverse. Similarly, Peter Vallentyne writes: “Almost all (if
not all) authors require that a theory maximize the good in order to be teleological.”
See Vallentyne, “The Teleological/Deontological Distinction,” Journal of Value Inquiry
21 (1987): 27; emphasis in original. But not all authors so require: John Stuart Mill
does not.
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utilitarianism against critics from the other school who drew the same
distinction. The crucial point here is that even hedonic ethical egoism
Mill declared to be “upon the whole on the utilitarian side of the con-
troversy” (letter to Grote, no. 525 [1862], CW 15:762). Despite its rejec-
tion of axiological impartiality, the cornerstone of utilitarianism, hedon-
ic ethical egoism is both teleological and empirical. It offers what Mill
called an “external standard” by which to assess moral judgment: the
happiness of the agent.
Hence, a teleological theory can reject both axiological and
deontic impartiality since nothing requires such a theory to treat all
good and bad consequences equally, much less identically. Some bad
consequences might make an action foolish or even shameful rather
than—not just in addition to—wrong; indeed, I will argue that this was
Mill’s view. According to this taxonomy, which was accepted on both
sides of the nineteenth-century debate, a teleological theory counts as
utilitarian simply by adopting all happiness as the sole intrinsic good: the
thesis Mill refers to as the principle of utility.35 Those teleological theo-
ries that deny axiological impartiality and, hence, the principle of utility
(such as egoism and asceticism) are not utilitarian, even though Mill
took them to be closer to utilitarianism than to its contemporary intu-
itionist antagonists. Those theories that accept axiological impartiality
thereby hold that the agent’s happiness is no more or less valuable than
anyone else’s; however, this does not imply that it gives rise to exactly the
same reasons, or the same kind of reasons, as does other people’s happi-
ness. Contrary to the impartial spectator trope and the thesis of deontic
impartiality, my own good may give me only prudential, not moral, rea-
sons to act.
If I am right to insist that we must understand utilitarianism
broadly enough to include the views of the classical Utilitarians, then
some forms of utilitarianism will not be consequentialist. Thus the ini-
tial “trick” that allowed me to deny that utilitarianism entails consequen-
tialism was actually ground clearing necessary to expose a tacit and sub-
stantive assumption of consequentialism, which need not be accepted
even by a teleological theory that subscribes to the principle of util-
ity. That assumption is deontic impartiality, the claim that evaluative
35. See D. G. Brown, “What Is Mill’s Principle of Utility?” Canadian Journal of Philos-
ophy 3 (1973): 33–39. Unfortunately, Mill is not very consistent in his terminology, and
he can be careless about differentiating the principle of utility (an axiological claim)
from the greatest happiness principle (a moral claim).
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consequences count identically toward the moral assessment of action,
regardless of who suffers or benefits. The first part of my argument is
now secured: I have shown that it is possible for a utilitarian theory to
reject consequentialism. In what follows, I contend that this argument
has not merely mapped some uninhabited logical space. In fact, John
Stuart Mill, the transitional figure between Jeremy Bentham (the first
“philosophical utilitarian”) and Henry Sidgwick (the great systematic
utilitarian) held a nonconsequentialist form of utilitarianism. Or so I
will now argue.
II.
In this section of the essay, I turn to the question of whether Mill
accepted deontic impartiality and, hence, whether his moral theory was
consequentialist. Consider the central problem of Mill interpretation:
how to make the principle of liberty consistent with his utilitarian com-
mitments. Mill introduces his principle of liberty in the most uncompro-
mising terms, with a forceful rejection of paternalism that seems in obvi-
ous tension with the injunction of orthodox utilitarianism to maximize
net happiness, impartially considered. “Over himself, over his own body
and mind, the individual is sovereign” (OL: 1.9), Mill insists; yet many
paternalistic rules seem justified according to orthodox utilitarianism.
Laws requiring motorists to wear seat belts, for instance, would compel
people for their own good, and such laws are probably optimific. But
Mill does not pause to consider specifically the most defensible pater-
nalistic laws; he seems to think he has a general argument with strong
antipaternalist implications. Otherwise how could he (ibid.) claim, so
peremptorily, that a person’s “own good, either physical or moral, is not
a sufficient warrant” for compelling him to act or to forbear from acting?
Although the currently predominant view attributes an orthodox
consequentialist moral theory to Mill, its advocates are hard-pressed to
reconcile their interpretation with what Mill actually says. Roger Crisp
is exemplary for facing up to these difficulties most forthrightly. Crisp
admits that his sophisticated, multilevel act-utilitarian interpretation
ultimately entails a dissimulation hypothesis, on which many of Mill’s
overt claims are held to be misrepresented, insincere, or at least greatly
exaggerated. These include such central doctrines as Mill’s antipater-
nalism and uncompromising defense of individual liberty, his embrace
of supererogation, and his claim that moral rules issue in genuine obli-
gations. For example, Crisp simply denies that the principle of liberty
175
D A N I E L J A C O B S O N
gives anything like a fundamental limit to justifiable social interference
with the liberty of the individual, as Mill asserts. He claims to the con-
trary that: “To put it bluntly, if social interference will maximize welfare
overall, then that legitimizes the interference, even if it might appear to
be an encroachment on the self-regarding sphere.”36 Notwithstanding
Mill’s explicit claims about rights, obligations, and the limits of morality,
Crisp holds that “when he was engaged in doing serious moral philos-
ophy, that is, in making claims about what really makes actions right or
wrong,” Mill embraces the orthodox consequentialist form of utilitari-
anism according to which: “Actions are right or wrong solely in so far as
they promote happiness or unhappiness.”37
The burden on this interpretation becomes most telling when
Mill confronts the still influential objection that utilitarianism makes
morality wildly overdemanding, requiring us to treat our commitments
and relationships as merely opportunities to do good that must be
forsaken whenever there is more good to be done elsewhere.38 Mill
responds by denying that utilitarianism makes anything like such severe
demands on ordinary people who have no special duties or excep-
tional powers to affect public utility. Crisp’s commentary is revealing.
He writes:
Utilitarianism is almost certainly much more demanding than Mill
allows. It is tempting to think, in fact, that Mill is deliberately being
disingenuous here. . . . Better to persuade a reader to become a feeble
utilitarian than put them off entirely by stressing the demandingness of
utilitarian morality.39
No doubt Crisp is correct that the orthodox consequentialism he
attributes to Mill has these implications. Moreover, the proponent of
an esoteric morality might think such insincerity justified. Yet this
36. Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism, 185.
37. Ibid., 111–12. Like other advocates of the standard view, Crisp focuses on the
proportionality statement of the greatest happiness principle (given in U: 2.2) and
shoehorns the rest of Mill to fit its allegedly consequentialist shape. He thus concludes
that the principle of liberty “cannot ground any kind of liberalism in Mill’s thought
which is inconsistent with his act utilitarianism” (ibid., 175).
38. This complaint gets its most influential modern development in Bernard
Williams, “Against Utilitarianism,” in Utilitarianism: For and Against, ed. J. J. C. Smart
and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); and Michael
Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” Journal of Philosophy 73
(1976): 453–66.
39. Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism, 115.
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conventional reading does so much violence to what Mill actually wrote
that it is almost fair to wonder if its advocates are actually reading Mill,
as opposed to projecting their own anachronistic consequentialist the-
ory upon him. Not only did Mill never broach the idea of an esoteric
morality, he held the virtue of sincerity in such high regard that he
chose to jeopardize his political prospects rather than dissemble about
his unpopular opinions.40
I say “almost fair” because it must be granted that chapter 2 of
Utilitarianism, in particular, contains passages that lend themselves to
this conventional reading (along with others that are inconsistent with
it). Yet there are powerful reasons to doubt the centrality of that work
and to eschew placing too much emphasis on the proportionality state-
ment of the greatest happiness principle (GHP), which is the linchpin of
the standard interpretation. In fact, there is an abundance of evidence
that Mill did not place on this work anything like the importance that
canonization has placed upon it. Nor did he intend the proportionality
formulation of GHP—on which “actions are right in proportion as they
tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse
of happiness” (U: 2.2)—to be the official statement of his own moral
theory. Rather, he puts this forward as a vague and equivocally stated
“creed,” acceptable to all Utilitarians because it merely “denotes the
recognition of utility as a standard, not any particular way of applying
it” (U: 2.1n).41 In a sense, this can be seen as another respect in which
current interpretations of Mill suffer from anachronism. Although his
ambitions for what he called this “little work” (Autobiography, CW 1:265)
40. Mill set as a precondition of his running for parliament that he not be required
to answer questions concerning his religious beliefs (or lack thereof). Indeed, the “rule
of veracity” was perhaps foremost of the many duties and virtues that, in Mill’s view,
have such significant indirect consequences as to almost always preclude breaching
them in specific cases. As he wrote to Henry Brandreth: “The duty of truth as a positive
duty is also to be considered on the ground of whether more good or harm would
follow to mankind in general if it were generally disregarded and not merely whether
good or harm would follow in a particular case” (letter to Brandreth, no. 1028 [1867],
CW 16:1234).
41. But compare Crisp (Mill on Utilitarianism, 7–8), who writes: “Insofar as Mill was
an evangelist, Utilitarianism . . . can be seen as his bible. Though it was not written in the
high and polished style of On Liberty or The Subjection of Women, it was clearly intended
to be the summation, and defense, of his thoughts on the doctrine which provided the
foundation for his views in other areas.” For argument that this is exactly the wrong
way to approach Mill and Utilitarianism, see Jacobson, “Diversity of Utilitarianism.”
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were decidedly modest, its historical impact has proven immense. This
issue is of the utmost importance for Mill interpretation.
I have argued against the standard interpretation elsewhere and
cannot attempt a full account of Mill’s moral and political philosophy
here. Rather than defend my reading against the consequentialist alter-
native, or canvass problematic passages for each, I propose to take a
simpler approach. I will start with the central tenets of On Liberty—in
particular, Mill’s defense of a sphere of self-regarding action and the
principle of liberty itself—and consider what sort of utilitarian moral
theory can accommodate them. Then I will marshal independent evi-
dence that Mill held such an unorthodox form of utilitarianism, which
rejects the demand of deontic impartiality that everyone’s happiness
must be treated identically in determining the morality of an action.
I will not be defending the principle of liberty here but arguing that,
despite its tension with consequentialism, Mill’s strict antipaternalism
and his defense of a substantial sphere of individual liberty cohere neatly
with his conception of morality and the limits of obligation.
Recall our preliminary discussion of purely self-regarding action,
which focused on acts that have no effect, or no harmful effect, on any-
one but the agent. I claimed there, without argument, that Mill had a
substantially broader conception of self-regarding action than this con-
ventional understanding allows. Mill clearly states that by self-regarding
action he means those acts that primarily concern only the agent; and
he allows that some self-regarding acts will affect others negatively, even
in ways to which they would not consent. It is worth quoting the most
important passage on this point, from On Liberty (4.10); Mill writes:
I fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself may seri-
ously affect, both through their sympathies and their interests, those
nearly connected with him, and in a minor degree, society at large.
When, by conduct of this sort, a person is led to violate a distinct and
assignable obligation to any other person or persons, the case is taken
out of the self-regarding class, and becomes amenable to moral disap-
probation in the proper sense of the term.
This passage, which gives Mill’s most developed exposition of self-
regarding action, should be taken as his official view of the subject. It
allows him to grant the obvious point that even his paradigms of self-
regarding action, such as the expression of opinion and sentiment, can
harm people both directly (by hurting their feelings) and indirectly (by
setting back their interests). But although the opinion that corn dealers
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are starvers of the poor, for instance, might prove detrimental to their
interests, its expression cannot legitimately be punished except in con-
texts where it constitutes incitement to riot.42
Two crucial points follow, the first of which does not depend on
any contentious interpretive issue. Mill clearly implies that when a per-
son “does mischief ” to himself, his action is not yet amenable to moral disap-
probation, though both agent and act can be criticized in other terms—as
selfish, intemperate, or foolish. This claim directly contradicts the thesis
of deontic impartiality by drawing a fundamental self/other asymmetry
with regard to the moral relevance of happiness, thereby confuting the
impartial spectator metaphor.43 Hence Mill’s advocacy of a sphere of lib-
erty, within which the individual is immune from moral disapprobation
and other forms of social coercion, conflicts intractably with consequen-
tialism by treating the agent’s interests differently than the interests of
others. Moreover, as the passage quoted above strongly suggests, Mill
had a considerably broader conception of self-regarding action than
just those acts that affect no one but the agent. He thus places a much
larger class of action beyond the pale of morality, in the sense that these
actions are not apt for moral disapprobation (when things go badly
for the agent) or specifically moral approval (when things go well, and
the agent maximizes net happiness by improving his or her own lot).44
42. This example is developed at OL: 3.1. Compare OL: 2.1n, where Mill argues
that “there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter
of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered.” See also
OL: 2.11, where Mill claims that the “pernicious consequences” of an opinion do not
justify its repression. See Jacobson, “Mill on Liberty,” for more discussion of this point.
43. That is not to say that it violates every standard of impartiality. This view is
compatible with Mill’s axiological impartiality (on which everyone’s happiness counts
equally) and with his insistence on the reciprocal nature of rights and obligations
(which grants no one any special rights or more exigent obligations). However, since
the metaphor of the perfectly sympathetic and impartial spectator is designed to pre-
scind from any consideration of who is benefited or harmed by an action—as Rawls
puts it, the trope applies the principle of rationality for one person to society as a
whole—it cannot rule out the harms an agent brings upon himself as morally irrele-
vant. I am grateful to Julia Driver for pressing this issue in discussion.
44. I should emphasize that it is the action (of hitting my thumb with a hammer,
say), not the pain caused by it, that seems morally irrelevant according to common
sense and that is claimed by Mill to be beyond the pale of moral assessment. This point
is best illustrated by contrasting the agent’s perspective with that of another person. As
my friend, you might have a duty to try talking me out of this foolish behavior; if so,
then the pain I propose to inflict upon myself for no reason is relevant to the morality
of your action or inaction. The crucial claim here is not that my pain somehow doesn’t
count, as an axiological matter—it does. It makes the world worse than it would be
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This latter point will be explicated when we consider Mill’s account of
supererogatory action.
Rather than attempting to shoehorn what Mill says into a precon-
ception of his moral theory, I propose to take seriously this passage and
others equally inconsistent with consequentialism. Mill claims that only
when an action that would otherwise be self-regarding violates an obli-
gation, because of the specific circumstances in which it is performed,
does it become amenable to moral disapprobation. Note first that if Mill
thought we had a general obligation to maximize net happiness, this
claim would make little sense. According to the orthodox position, we
do wrong whenever we fail to act for the best. Here Mill is considering
actions, such as intemperate drinking or gambling, which are not gen-
erally optimific; yet he claims that these are, ordinarily, self-regarding
actions despite their tendency to be self-destructive and even harmful
to nonconsenting others. Crucially, though, these actions harm non-
consenting others only in those respects for which “society admits no
right . . . to immunity from this kind of suffering” (OL: 5.3). The inter-
pretive challenge this passage poses should be clear. What makes self-
regarding action not amenable to moral disapprobation even when it
fails to maximize happiness? The answer lies in Mill’s account of the
meaning of moral terms, which ties them to specific sentiments.
Consider what Mill says about right and wrong—not the GHP
given in chapter 2 of Utilitarianism, but the metaethical account given
in chapter 5. There (5.14) he writes:
I think there is no doubt that this distinction lies at the bottom of the
notions of right and wrong; that we call any conduct wrong, or employ,
instead, some other term of dislike or disparagement, according as we
think that the person ought, or ought not, to be punished for it; and
we say that it would be right to do so and so, or merely that it would
be desirable or laudable, according as we would wish to see the person
whom it concerns, compelled, or only persuaded and exhorted, to act
in that manner.
According to Mill, then, wrong acts are by definition punishable or blame-
worthy. He uses those two terms synonymously because he understands
punishment to include not just legal sanction of the agent, or even the
otherwise, and this may be relevant to moral judgment of other actions. But this is
entirely compatible with the denial that it is wrong for me to hit my own thumb. I am
grateful to David Boonin for pressing me to clarify my view on this point.
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external sanction of others (expressed in such blaming sentiments as
outrage), but also “the reproaches of his own conscience” (U: 5.14): that
is, guilt. Analogously, when Mill calls an action right, obligatory, or a
duty, he means that it is compulsory.
Mill’s metaethical position is commonly misunderstood on just
this point, due in part to his loose talk of what “ought to be pun-
ished” and when “we would wish to see [someone] compelled,” both
of which sound like verdictive (all-in) judgments. The common mis-
reading commits two symmetrical errors: it makes light of his claim that
some actions—the supererogatory ones—deserve praise and admiration
but are not compulsory, and it misconstrues when actions deserve pun-
ishment. It thereby mistakes Mill’s view of both right and wrong. Let’s
start by considering wrongness. The conventional reading attributes to
Mill the view that an act is punishable, and therefore wrong, when-
ever punishing it has good (or perhaps best) consequences.45 This posi-
tion resembles the so-called Utilitarian Theory of Punishment, which
only looks forward at the consequences of punishment, not backward
at whether punishment is deserved. Since Mill considers the blame of
others and even the self-reproach of the agent’s own conscience to be
forms of punishment, this implies (roughly) that an act is punishable
whenever it would be optimific for an agent to feel guilty over doing
it.46 But that cannot be Mill’s view.
In the first place, when Mill says, too casually, that wrong acts
ought to be punished, he cannot be expressing an all-things-considered
45. This interpretation is put most clearly by David Brink, who holds Mill to claim
“that an action is wrong just in case some kind of external or internal sanction attached
to it (punishment, blame, or self-reproach) would have good—perhaps optimific—
consequences.” David Brink, “Mill’s Deliberative Utilitarianism,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 21 (1992): 69. See also John Gray, Mill on Liberty: A Defense (London: Routledge,
1983), 31; and Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism, 129. All these authors understand Mill to
hold that wrong acts are those it would be optimific to punish.
46. Guilt is just one of the three kinds of punishment Mill discusses—the other two
being law and the blame of others—but it is the one least likely to have unintended
negative consequences. Hence, Crisp (Mill on Utilitarianism, 129) writes: “there is no
imaginable case of an agent’s failing to maximize happiness to which Mill would be
forced to retract any attribution of wrongness. For he can always claim that the non-
maximizing agent should be punished by the reproaches of their conscience.” But this
is not what Mill actually claims, since he never suggests that an agent who fails to per-
form a supererogatory act should feel guilty about the omission; on the contrary, this
is just what he denies by denying that the agent acts wrongly. The conventional reading
thus combines two errors by conjoining a maximizing act-consequentialist theory of
rightness with the forward-looking theory of punishment.
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judgment. Mill explicitly allows that some punishable acts should not actually
be punished because in the specific circumstances legal sanction, blame,
or even guilt would be inexpedient. In such cases, he (U: 5.14) writes:
“Reasons of prudence, or the interest of other people, may militate
against actually exacting [someone’s duty]; but the person himself, it is
clearly understood, would not be entitled to complain.” One who shirks
one’s duty deserves punishment, Mill (ibid.) claims—which is why that
person would have no complaint about being compelled before the fact
or punished afterward—but it is a distinct question whether, all things
considered, such coercion should be employed. People are punishable
not whenever it’s expedient to punish them, but only when they are
“the proper objects of punishment.” Doing wrong makes one eligible for
punishment, but considerations of expediency also count toward deter-
mining when punishable agents should in fact be punished. Then they
should be punished by whatever means is optimific, whether legal sanc-
tion, the blame of others, self-reproach, or all of the above.47
This is as far as Mill’s discussion goes, which is far enough to
undermine the conventional interpretation. Since Mill does not explain
just what are the proper objects of guilt and blame, we must move some-
what beyond the text at this point; but I have some good company
in doing so—most notably David Lyons.48 As I see it, Mill holds the
quintessentially sentimentalist thesis that an act is wrong whenever guilt
over it would be fitting from the agent, and resentment fitting from oth-
ers.49 This proposal raises some inevitable questions: What makes guilt
fitting, when it is; and how is such talk of the fittingness of emotions
47. On this point see Alan Ryan, “John Stuart Mill’s Art of Living,” in J. S. Mill: On
Liberty in Focus, ed. John Gray and G. W. Smith (London: Routledge, 1991), 162–68.
48. Lyons writes, “Mill seems to be saying that wrong acts are those for which guilt
feelings are appropriate” and “these [feelings] are appropriate only when correspond-
ing informal social rules could be justified.” See Lyons, “Mill’s Theory of Morality,” in
Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory, 53, 57. See also Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “You
Ought to Be Ashamed of Yourself (When You Violate an Imperfect Moral Obligation),”
Philosophical Issues 15 (2005): 194: “Mill’s considered view seems to be that people who
violate obligations are liable to punishment in the sense that they themselves are not
wronged or entitled to complain if they are punished (to an appropriate degree).” The
crucial point is that some notion of emotional fittingness or appropriateness must be
adduced, which is necessary but not sufficient for justifying punishment.
49. In Mill’s view, anger is a proto-moral emotion, which must be refined into
resentment in order to be fitting only at moral transgressions rather than at any dis-
agreeable action, indiscriminately. Thus, “a person whose resentment is really a moral




compatible with Mill’s utilitarian and liberal commitments? Since per-
haps the three most obvious answers do not work, I will begin by discard-
ing them. First, one might say that guilt is fitting whenever you would in
fact feel it. This proposal makes guilt self-ratifying, which conflicts with
Mill’s repeated insistence on an “external standard” for justifying moral
emotions and intuitions. Second, one might say that guilt is fitting when-
ever you have done wrong; but this would be viciously circular since
we are trying to explicate wrongness. Finally, one might say that guilt
is fitting whenever it’s best to feel it. But this traduces the distinction
between fitting and optimific emotions, and it collapses the distinction
between the conventional position and my own. So much for the bad
answers. Can we do any better?
Let’s start with an obviously limited claim, in hopes of developing
a more general schema. Surely guilt is fitting when someone commits
a murder (for instance). But what justifies even this weak claim? The
first thing to note is that Mill differentiates between the moral aspect of
an action and its other evaluative aspects: both its prudence and its aes-
thetic qualities, understood as the act’s beauty, nobility, or lovableness.50
“The morality of an action depends on its foreseeable consequences,”
as does its prudence, according to Mill, whereas “its beauty, and its lov-
ableness, or the reverse, depend on the qualities which it is evidence of”
(“Bentham,” CW 10:112). Although the moral and prudential evaluation
of acts depends upon their foreseeable consequences, these other forms
of evaluation, which Mill loosely calls aesthetic, are directed instead at
the character of an agent as it is revealed in action. Indeed, this differ-
ence lies at the heart of the distinction between guilt and resentment, on
one hand, and shame and contempt, on the other.51 I will come back to
this point about the difference between moral and nonmoral sentiments
presently.
Opponents of utilitarianism frequently complain that so many of
the consequences of action are unforeseeable that the theory provides
little guidance. Mill responds by saying that this complaint proves too
50. Mill drew a tripartite distinction between the spheres of value throughout his
mature work, from “Bentham” (1838) to A System of Logic (1843) to Utilitarianism
(1861). Unfortunately he draws this distinction in slightly different ways each time. I
have finessed these differences here; the important point is that in every case morality
is understood narrowly, as concerning whether an action is right or wrong, which is
just one of its three evaluative aspects.
51. See June Tangney and Ronda Dearing, Shame and Guilt (New York: Guilford
Press, 2002).
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much since it would also tell against ordinary prudence, which everyone
accepts. Thus, he writes:
Whether morality is or is not a question of consequences, [one] can-
not deny that prudence is; and if there is such a thing as prudence,
it is because the consequences of actions can be calculated. Prudence,
indeed, depends on a calculation of individual actions, while for the
establishment of moral rules it is only necessary to calculate the conse-
quences of classes of action—a much easier matter. (“Whewell on Moral
Philosophy,” CW 10:180)
It is obviously a good idea to have a general rule prohibiting murder
because that class of action has foreseeably bad consequences, and often
enough murder can be deterred by sanctions without undue costs. Such
a rule both obligates people not to commit murder and gives them the
right not to be murdered. Therefore a moral rule can be justified estab-
lishing the fittingness of guilt (from the agent) and resentment (from
others) over murder—though surely acts of murder will be best pre-
vented by legal sanction.52
This schema justifies certain moral rules, both informal social
norms and expressly posited laws, by the utility of their acceptance.
These moral rules, in turn, determine when guilt and resentment are fit-
ting. Whenever a moral rule has been broken, the agent has done wrong
and is punishable—though it may or may not be expedient actually to
punish him or her, depending on contingencies of the circumstance.
Although the justified moral rules will vary across times and cultures, this
is not a form of relativism, in that it does not ratify the status quo moral-
ity. The fact that a moral rule has been adopted by some society does not
suffice to justify it. On the contrary, Mill was keen to criticize many actual
social rules for lacking utilitarian justification. As he puts it, “The contest
between the morality which appeals to an external standard, and that
which grounds itself on internal conviction, is the contest of progres-
sive morality against stationary—of reason and argument against mere
opinion and habit” (ibid.,179). Whence Mill’s account of the fittingness
52. This view bears an obvious resemblance to the moral theory developed by Allan
Gibbard, who expressly cites Mill as an influence. See Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 41. It is the sentimentalist aspect
of Gibbard’s view, not the expressivism, which is crucial here. For discussion of how
sentimentalism can cohere with various metaethical theories, see Justin D’Arms and
Daniel Jacobson, “Sensibility Theory and Projectivism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical
Theory, ed. David Copp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 186–218.
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of the moral sentiments: guilt and resentment are fitting over the viola-
tions of moral rules proscribing classes of action, justified on the basis of
the utility of their acceptance. A crucial requirement of rule acceptance
is that it must engage one’s moral emotions; to accept the rule against
theft is to be disposed to feel guilty about committing theft and to resent
others who steal, as well as to deem such responses fitting.
Although Mill’s sanction-based moral theory is a form of indirect
utilitarianism, his sentimentalist metaethics differentiates the view from
ordinary rule-utilitarianism because the moral sentiments distinguish
the moral realm from the prudential and the aesthetic. In short (and
too crudely): things we cannot feel guilty about doing, or resent other
people for doing, cannot be wrong—though they may be amenable to
other forms of criticism.53 In order for a norm for the fittingness of guilt
to effectively regulate people’s guilt responses, it must answer to that
emotion’s characteristic concern, to what it is about. Thus one feature
of the acceptance-utility of a norm for the fittingness of guilt, absent
in moral rules not grounded in the sentiments, is that norms for guilt
must answer to the inherent constraints of the emotion. Guilt serves
as a discrete motivational system that issues in the motivation to make
reparations to the wronged party.54 This point exposes the psychologi-
cal underpinnings of the commonsense verdict, considered earlier, that
harms the agent does to himself or herself merit not guilt (from the
agent) and resentment (from others), but other emotions—depending
on the case, perhaps either pity or contempt. When I harm myself for no
good reason, I should feel no temptation to make reparations to myself.
The point is not just that we won’t in fact feel guilty over
harming ourselves, though that is true and important; moreover, we do
not endorse feeling guilty about it. When we act foolishly, regret, which
motivates policy change, is fitting; not guilt, which motivates making
amends. Something similar holds for resentment, which, as a species of
anger, motivates retaliation. We feel no temptation to retaliate against
53. While actual dispositions to guilt and resentment do not settle what is wrong,
the essential tie to the sentiments constrains moral judgment to those actions we can
feel guilty about. A similar treatment of nonmoral value is discussed in Justin D’Arms
and Daniel Jacobson, “Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value,” Oxford Studies
in Metaethics 1 (2006): 99–126.
54. For an account of the sentiments as discrete motivational syndromes, which
do not already involve the evaluative concepts sentimentalists seek to explicate, see
Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotions (or,
Anti-Quasijudgmentalism),” Philosophy 52 (2003): 127–45. On guilt in particular, see
Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings; Tangney and Dearing, Shame and Guilt.
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someone who foolishly hurts himself or herself, such as the drunk
with no dependents or creditors—the person whose actions Mill says
are not amenable to moral disapprobation. Punishment is not then
in order, whether or not negative sanctions would be beneficial to the
foolish agent. When you harm only yourself, we are moved neither to
retaliate against you nor to make reparations to you, even if by harming
yourself you bring about less than the best available (and expected)
consequences, impartially considered. The crucial point is that plausible
norms for the fittingness of guilt and resentment are constrained by
the nature of those sentiments, which are not about self-inflicted harms
or other failures to respect yourself. Thus a sentimentalist account
of wrongness, such as Mill’s, lends itself to the self/other asymmetry
embraced by commonsense morality and contradicted by the deontic
impartiality of consequentialism—even indirect consequentialism. As
we shall see, this point helps explain the peremptoriness of Mill’s
antipaternalism.
First, though, consider Mill’s analogous view of rightness and
compulsion. The concepts of the obligatory and the punishable are con-
nected, of course, since the principal way we compel actions is by threat-
ening to punish their omission. Hence, right actions are compulsory
in principle, whether or not the specific circumstances of the case jus-
tify such compulsion. Just as not all harmful actions are punishable, on
Mill’s view, not all beneficial actions are obligatory. He explicitly states
the implication of his claim that some “desirable and laudable” acts can-
not properly be compelled, as follows (U: 5.14):
There are other things, on the contrary, which we wish that people
should do, which we like or admire them for doing, perhaps dislike or
despise them for not doing, but yet admit that they are not bound to
do; it is not a case of moral obligation; we do not blame them, that is,
we do not think that they are proper objects of punishment.
Since such actions are not moral obligations, Mill holds that they are not
proper objects of compulsion and punishment. Someone who was com-
pelled to perform such an act, or punished for not doing so, would have
a complaint against society, unlike the wrongdoer. Hence, these actions
are genuinely supererogatory, not merely impractical to compel.55
55. Although it is often overlooked, there is abundant evidence of Mill’s commit-
ment to supererogation, especially in Sedgwick’s Discourse (1833), Auguste Compte and
Positivism (1865), and his letter to Henry Brandreth (no. 1029 [1867]).
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At this point someone might want to reject Mill’s narrow concep-
tion of morality, which limits the moral evaluation of action to questions
of right and wrong, obligation and compulsion. Thus Sinnott-Armstrong
objects that “morality [also] includes what is ideal and good but not a
duty or obligation.”56 Since my primary purpose here is to argue that
Mill’s theory of right and wrong conflicts intractably with consequen-
tialism, I need not dispute the issue of how broadly to construe moral-
ity. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Mill anticipated the distinc-
tion between a narrow and a broad notion of morality, which would
later be drawn in similar terms by philosophers such as Allan Gibbard
and Bernard Williams.57 In Mill’s view, there are two “co-equal” parts
of morality: along with the narrow part concerning the regulation of
external action, which has been our focus here, there is a broader part
concerning “self-education, the training, by the human being himself,
of his affections and will” (“Bentham,” CW 10:98). There is a decidedly
perfectionist strain to Mill’s thought about the broader ethical ques-
tions of how to live, when narrowly moral issues of obligation are not
at play; though, as with all practical concerns, his perfectionism is ulti-
mately grounded in the principle of utility. Nevertheless, in considering
both supererogatory and ignoble actions, Mill looks not to their conse-
quences so much as to what they show about the character of the agent.
We cannot adequately understand Mill’s ethics without keep-
ing in mind what he called the three departments of the Art of Life:
morality, prudence, and aesthetics. These three evaluative spheres con-
cern respectively the right, the expedient, and the beautiful or noble
in human conduct and character. This idiosyncratic distinction mat-
ters because Mill’s treatment of the supererogatory parallels what he
says about self-regarding character flaws. Recall Mill’s claim that the
beauty, lovableness, and nobility of an action—as well as their negative
counterparts—“depend on the qualities which [the act] is evidence of”
56. Sinnott-Armstrong, “You Ought to Be Ashamed of Yourself,” 194. My differ-
ence with Sinnott-Armstrong is superficial and terminological; on the fundamental
sentimentalist point we agree.
57. Thus Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, 6) writes: “We can understand the term
[‘morality’] broadly or narrowly. Broadly the moral question is how to live. Narrowly,
we might try saying, morality concerns moral sentiments: the sentiments of guilt and
resentment and their variants.” See also Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philos-
ophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), who contrasts narrow morality
with broad ethics—also construed as concerning the fundamental question of how to
live.
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(“Bentham,” CW 10:112). Thus action that is neither right nor wrong,
but which manifests virtue or vice, belongs to the aesthetic sphere,
whose characteristic sentiments (such as shame and pride, contempt
and admiration) are directed not directly at action but at the charac-
ter manifested in it. Hence, Mill’s treatment of supererogation differs
from even the (unorthodox, satisficing) consequentialist account pre-
cisely because it matters, for Mill, who gets benefited or harmed. When
an action X has better consequences than Y because of its benefits to the
agent, someone who chooses to sacrifice his own interests (by doing Y)
for the good of others—contrary to the common good, impartially calcu-
lated, which includes his own good—may be more admirable than one who
maximizes net happiness by doing X. Indeed, the person who does Y will
be more admirable whenever the motivation for that action indicates a
virtuous disposition.58
The drunk who does not act wrongly because he violates no obli-
gation, and the philanthropist who does more than duty requires, typ-
ically are fitting objects of distinctive negative and positive sentiments:
specifically, those emotions that do not focus directly on action (as do
guilt and resentment) but on the qualities of the agent manifest in
action (as do shame and contempt). We feel guilty over what we’ve done;
we feel ashamed of who we are. Compare what Mill (OL: 4.5) says about
self-regarding vices, which are unpleasant but not punishable:
There is a degree of folly, and a degree of what may be called . . . lowness
or depravation of taste, which, though it cannot justify doing harm
to the person who manifests it, renders him necessarily and properly
a subject of distaste, or, in extreme cases, even of contempt. . . . [B]ut
he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural, and,
as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, not
because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment.
Analogously, although supererogatory action by definition creates a bet-
ter state of affairs than can be compelled, I contend that for Mill such
action not only fails to be obligatory, but is praiseworthy only insofar as
58. It might be recalled that Mill (U: 2.17) writes, “A sacrifice which does not
increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, [utilitarian morality] consid-
ers as wasted.” But the case I consider above, where the sacrifice increases the happi-
ness of others but not the sum total of all concerned (including the agent), is just the
sort of peculiar example Mill simply did not bother with in this brief treatise. More-
over, he (ibid.) immediately continues by making a statement strictly compatible with
my claim: “The only self-renunciation which it applauds, is devotion to the happiness,
or to some of the means of happiness, of others.”
188
Utilitarianism without Consequentialism
it manifests a virtuous character.59 Thus Mill’s account of supereroga-
tion is also sensitive to who is benefited, in a manner incompatible with
deontic impartiality but in line with commonsense morality.
The main point of my argument is not that Mill rejects the max-
imizing demands of orthodox consequentialism—though this is true,
important, and insufficiently acknowledged. The point is rather that,
according to Mill’s metaethics, an act isn’t wrong unless it is punish-
able; and it isn’t right unless it is compulsory. This is crucial because Mill
states in the clearest possible terms both that self-regarding action can-
not properly be punished and that a sound-minded adult cannot prop-
erly be compelled for his or her own good. This, of course, is what Mill
(OL: 1.9) famously refers to as the principle of liberty:
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because
it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.
These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with
him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him
or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.
In short, the good of promoting the agent’s own happiness does not jus-
tify compulsion, and the bad of causing the agent’s unhappiness does
not give others grounds to inflict punishment. Prudent action is not
right action, even if it maximizes utility; and self-destructive action is not
wrong action, even if there is an available alternative with better conse-
quences.
Mill’s contemporaries, most notably Sidgwick, appreciated the
problem that consequentialism poses for antipaternalism and the prin-
ciple of liberty more generally.60 From a strictly impartial perspective,
it is unclear how Mill can be so peremptory about his antipaternalism,
59. Note that the fittingness of admiration for the philanthropist depends crucially
on his motives for acting, whereas the moral quality of the act depends merely on
what he (intentionally) does (see U: 2.15n). If the philanthropist’s true aim is self-
glorification, that does not taint the value of the act, but it does affect how it’s fitting
to feel about him. Similarly, the drunk might be more pitiable than contemptible,
depending on the circumstances.
60. See Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, esp. 478. Sidgwick calls the view utilitarianism
rather than consequentialism, of course, because the twentieth-century term had not
yet been coined.
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when it seems that any kind of consequentialist would have to be sen-
sitive to the effects of one’s self-destructive actions on others. Indeed,
it seems very likely that some paternalistically motivated laws, such as
those requiring the use of seat belts, will be optimific. However, Mill’s
principles follow much more clearly if moral rules—those concerning
the fittingness of guilt and anger—are determined by a utility calculus
that does not include the effects of self-regarding action on the agent
himself (nor those remote effects that might be brought about by the
agent’s example, which could lead others, by their own agency, to harm
themselves). Whereas rule-consequentialism determines the best moral
rules by considering all the consequences of their acceptance impar-
tially, Mill’s sentimentalist utilitarianism is sensitive to who is harmed
or benefited. This sensitivity follows from the nature of the moral sen-
timents themselves, namely, guilt and resentment, which are inherently
partial and asymmetric.
Mill’s discussion of self-regarding action and the principle of lib-
erty, in On Liberty, coheres with the metaethical account of right and
wrong given in Utilitarianism. In both discussions, Mill maintains a fun-
damental asymmetry between self and other, corresponding to the dis-
tinction between the spheres of morality and prudence. In so doing,
Mill follows the view of commonsense morality that it is foolish but not
wrong to act self-destructively, and prudent but not obligatory to max-
imize one’s own happiness even when that would be optimific. Thus Mill
flouts the strict form of impartiality entailed by the metaphor of the
impartial spectator, on which it makes no moral difference whose hap-
piness or unhappiness is affected by an act. In Mill’s view, morality does
not treat everyone’s happiness in exactly the same way (as deontic impar-
tiality demands) even though everyone’s happiness is of equal value (as
axiological impartiality requires). Mill expressly rejects deontic impar-
tiality by claiming that self-regarding but harmful acts are not amenable
to moral disapprobation and that we cannot be compelled for our own
good.
Any moral view that treats the agent’s interests differently from
others, in determining the rightness or wrongness of an action, does
not adopt strict, deontic impartiality. And any view that rejects deontic
impartiality is not consequentialist in the standard sense, widely adopted
by philosophers and motivated in the first section of this essay. Yet Mill
was a classical Utilitarian, not just because he was called a utilitarian
by his contemporaries and identified himself as one, but because his
moral theory is teleological and accepts the principle of utility as its
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axiology. Although my interpretation of Mill’s view makes him a highly
unorthodox utilitarian, this is in keeping with Mill’s self-description,
quoted earlier. Moreover, it agrees with the assessment of Mill’s con-
temporaries such as John Grote (who termed Mill a neo-utilitarian) and
Henry Sidgwick (who called Mill a “conservative utilitarian” for hold-
ing that moral rules issue in genuine obligations).61 Hence, there is no
paradox involved in claiming that there is logical space for a utilitarian
theory that rejects consequentialism, and there is considerable evidence
for ascribing such a view to that most renowned, though not most ortho-
dox, utilitarian, John Stuart Mill.
61. See Henry Sidgwick, Essays on Ethics and Method, ed. Marcus Singer (Oxford:
Clarendon, 2000), 174.
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